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We present rst estimates of rates of non-take-up for social assistance in Germany after
the implementation of major social policy reforms in 2005. The analysis is based on
a microsimulation model, which includes a detailed description of the German social
assistance programme. Our ndings suggest a moderate decrease in non-take-up com-
pared to estimates before the reform. In order to identify the determinants of claiming
social assistance, we estimate a model of take-up behaviour which considers potential
endogeneity of the benet level. The estimations reveal that the degree of needs, mea-
sured as the social assistance benet level a household is eligible for, and the expected
duration of eligibility are the key determinants of the take-up decision, while costs of
claiming seem to play a minor role.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie liefert erste Sch atzungen f ur Quoten der Nicht-Inanspruchnahme f ur Leis-
tungen der Grundsicherung nach SGB II und SGB XII. Die Analyse basiert auf ei-
nem Mikrosimulationsmodell, welches eine detaillierte Abbildung der deutschen So-
zialgesetzgebung erlaubt. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sich die Nicht-
Inanspruchnahme im Vergleich zur Situation vor der Hartz-IV-Reform verringert hat.
Um die Determinanten der Inanspruchnahme zu bestimmen, sch atzen wir ein Modell
des Inanspruchnahmeverhaltens. Die Sch atzungen zeigen, dass die H ohe des Anspruchs
sowie die erwartete Bezugsdauer die entscheidenden Einussfaktoren darstellen, w ah-
rend die Kosten der Inanspruchnahme eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen.
JEL classication: I38, H31, C15
Keywords: Non-Take-Up; Social Assistance; Microsimulation
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Arguably the most important goal of means-tested social benets is to ensure a min-
imum standard of living for every member of society. However, all studies on means-
tested social benets have noted that take-up of benets by those eligible is considerably
lower than 100%. Non-take-up can be seen as a failure of the welfare state to provide
the needy population with the minimum necessary resources. Take-up behaviour may
also have scal implications. If the take-up rate is positively related to the level of
entitlements, an increase in the general benet level will also increase the take-up rate
and consequently the scal costs of the benet hike. At rst glance, non-take-up of
social benets seems to be at odds with standard economic theory of rational, utility-
maximising individuals. Possible explanations put forward are the idea of stigma or
disutility associated with claiming the benet (Mott, 1983). Additionally, non-take-
up may simply reect a lack of awareness about the availability of the programme or a
potential claimer's expectation that the cost of applying for the benet would exceed
the benet available.
In 2005 major social policy reforms were implemented in Germany. The reform of
the social assistance system was preceded by intense public debate and increased the
public awareness about entitlements. Besides lower information costs, other aspects of
the reform, like new administrative arrangements and more generous entitlement rules,
might also have increased the take-up of social assistance (SA) after the reform. All
available studies on non-take-up in Germany are based on data collected before 2005.
They show high rates of non-take-up (RNTs), ranging from 43% (Wilde/Kubis, 2005)
to 67% (Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007).1
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by providing rst estimates of non-
take-up under the new social policy regime. First, we present results on RNTs based
on panel data for the years 2005 to 2007. The availability of three years of data allows
us to analyse a possible trend in the take-up rate since introduction of the new policy.
Second, we estimate a model of take-up behaviour in order to identify the determinants
of social benet take-up after the reform. The model takes into account the potential
endogeneity of the level of social assistance benets. Our results indicate a decrease in
the RNT compared to previous studies, especially for the years 2006 and 2007. The
decline proves to be robust to dierent simulation approaches. Additionally, our model
of take-up behaviour highlights the role of the degree of needs for the take-up decision,
measured as the benet level households are entitled to and other proxy variables.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we rst report pre-reform results on
take-up behaviour for Germany, which provide a point of reference for our post-reform
analysis. Then we give a short overview of the social policy reform enacted in 2005,
highlighting important changes to the former policy. Section 3 explains the data and
microsimulation model and presents results on RNTs. In Section 4, we augment our
1 See Frick/Groh-Samberg (2007) for an overview of empirical results on RNTs in Germany for the
period 1963 to 2003. For a review of the international literature on take-up behaviour, see van
Oorschot (1991).
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endogeneity of benets in the take-up decision. The estimation allows us to investigate
determinants of claiming social benets. Conclusions are set out in Section 5.
2 Social assistance in Germany
2.1 Non-take-up of social assistance before 2005
A number of studies provide empirical evidence on the magnitude and determinants
of non-take-up of SA in Germany (Riphahn, 2001; Kayser/Frick, 2001; Becker/Hauser,
2005; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007). The results on non-take-up and
claiming behaviour these studies reveal refer to the former SA system, which included
benets for employable persons as well as for older or unemployable people and they
are based on survey data collected before 2005.2 Table 1 summarises the results of the
latest studies on non-take-up.













RNT 0.63 0.63 0.46-0.60 0.43 0.67
Period 1993 1996 1998/1999 1999 2002
Data EVS GSOEP EVS/NIEP/
GSOEP
NIEP GSOEP
Note: RNTs are dened by the ratio of eligible households that do not take up their benets
and the total number of eligible households.
All studies make use of representative data sets to calculate the RNT and employ
regression analyses to explain the take-up of SA. Although the comparability of these
studies is limited due to dierent data sets and simulation approaches, two main ndings
can be summarised: First, the share of eligible households which did not take up their
entitlements was persistently high in the past, ranging from 43% in 1993 to 67% in 2002.
Second, the results obtained by regression analyses show that the expected utility of
the entitlements as well as information costs and stigmatisation play a signicant role
in explaining take-up behaviour.
2 The data sets used are the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the German Income and Ex-
penditure Survey (EVS) and the German Low Income Panel (NIEP).
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2.2.1 The reform process
From 2002 until 2005 the German means-tested benet system was reorganised through
a package of social and labour market reforms.3 Until 2005 the long-term unemployed
were eligible to means-tested SA or unemployment assistance (UA). The eligibility for
UA depended on a worker's employment history.4 The benet level was a function
of previous earnings net of taxes and mandatory contributions to social insurance.
Although tax nanced, the former UA was regarded as an insurance system. The
former SA, on the other hand, was the basic safety net and provided a guaranteed
income for all households in need, independent of their employability.
With the implementation of the so-called Hartz IV reform in 2005 a new SA legislation
came into force in Germany. The former systems of UA and SA were combined to form
the new means-tested SA for the long-term unemployed, contained in Book II of the
Social Code (SGB II). The Hartz IV reform is based on a consensus that the former SA
generated low incentives for long-term unemployed to take up low-paid work.5 Another
purpose of Hartz IV was to make all long-term unemployed individuals subject to the
same programme and the same measures of active labour market policies.6
The SGB II is targeted at employable persons younger than 65. For persons aged
65 and older and for unemployable persons a separate means-tested SA programme
exists, which is codied in Book XII of the Social Code (SGB XII). Since 2005 SGB II
and SGB XII form the new SA system. With more than 7 million recipients in 2005,
SGB II is by far the most important benet system.7 SGB II and SGB XII benets
include benets for living and housing costs. Other means-tested benets in Germany,
which play a minor role, are housing benets and the enhanced child benet. They are
prioritised8 over SA and cannot be claimed simultaneously with SA.9
3 Figure 1 in Appendix A gives an overview of the evolution of the most important means-tested
programmes during this period.
4 Workers were eligible to UA, if they were a) unemployed and looking for a job, b) not eligible to
unemployment benets (UB) and c) had claimed UB for at least one day during the year before they
led for UA. Eligibility to UB, on the other hand, required a) being unemployed and looking for a
job and b) having been employed subject to social security contributions for at least 360 days during
a period of three years before ling for unemployment benets.
5 The Hartz IV reform is the last part of a series of labour market reforms subsequently implemented
during 2003-2005. Jacobi/Kluve (2007) give a good overview of the aims and core elements of the
Hartz reforms.
6 Although SGB II grants income support for the long-term unemployed, the receipt of benets does
not depend on labour market status. It also provides a basic safety net for families with working
members, whose combined income is too low to meet the legally dened household's needs.
7 Only about 0.7 million. people received SGB XII in 2005.
8 Housing benets and enhanced child benets are prioritised over SA in the sense that a household
is legally obligated to claim them instead of SA, if the (combined) level of prioritised entitlements
increases the household's income to at least the minimum level guaranteed by SA.
9 We provide more information on the reform process and the reorganisation of the means-tested benet
system in Germany in Appendix A. Furthermore, Table 5 in Appendix A presents the numbers of
individuals receiving SGB II and SGB XII during the years 2005 to 2008.
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In 2005 former employable recipients of SA and of UA were transferred to the SGB II.
For former recipients of SA (2004) the means test in the new SGB II system is much
more generous with respect to the allowable maximum wealth and earnings disregards.
Table 6 in Appendix A shows the key features of the old UA and SA of the year 2004
as well as of the SA for employable (SGB II) and older or unemployable individuals
(SGB XII) introduced in 2005, including a comparison of the rules that determine the
maximum wealth and the earnings disregards between the systems. One aim of the old
SA system as well as of SGB II is to supplement families' income up to the guaranteed
income. Under the old SA system, the level of the standard benet of SA intended to
cover basic needs of living was established at the level of the 16 German states and
amounted to 295 EUR per month on average in 2004. Under the new SGB II system a
national standard benet of 345 EUR was introduced.10 Recipients of SA who were not
employable were transferred to SGB XII in 2005. The means tests of SGB XII and SA
of 2004 are almost identical. The maximum allowable wealth of a household increased
only slightly compared to the former system. Also, earnings disregards are only slightly
more generous in SGB XII compared to former SA. Therefore, unemployable recipients
of old SA did not experience a signicant change in entitlements. In summary, it can
be stated that the means test of the former SA was stricter than in the SGB II and it
was similar to the means test in SGB XII.
Former recipients of UA were reassigned to SGB II in 2005. For this subgroup, the
calculation of the entitlement level has changed substantially. The level of UA benets
depended on previous earnings because UA aimed at preserving the unemployed's living
standard. The replacement rate was 53%, and 57% for the unemployed with children.
Standard benets are dened identically for SGB II and SGB XII as the families' hous-
ing and living costs. The reform eects on the entitlement level of former recipients of
UA is unclear. Usually UA benets were higher than the guaranteed income. Neverthe-
less, unemployed persons with very low previous earnings could receive UA below the
minimum income. Consequently, it was possible for former recipients of UA to claim
UA and SA benets simultaneously. Additionally, the earnings disregards in SGB II are
more strict while the rules that dene the maximum allowable wealth remained con-
stant. Simulation studies (Schulte, 2004; Blos/Rudolph, 2005; Becker/Hauser, 2006)
on the eects of the Hartz IV reform on the income of former recipients of UA showed
that more than 60% of them faced income losses or even lost their entitlements, while
the benet level of former SA recipients was not aected. Hence, it was expected that
former recipients of UA would suer from income losses through the Hartz IV reform.
On the other hand, almost 40% of the recipients of UA would have potential income
gains through the implementation of the new eligibility conditions. This means that
the income of these recipients was below the minimum income and they did not take
10 The two benet levels cannot be directly compared, since the old SA system allowed for \one-time
benets" used to cover atypical needs of a household. These payments were abolished under the
SGB II. Instead, the average amount of the one-time benets was included as a lump sum payment
in the new standard benet. Thus, if one-time benets are taken into account, the standard benet
eectively did not change under the new SA.
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non-take-up of additional SA entitlements among former recipients of UA. Between
2005 and 2007 only minor changes in the rules determining eligibility in SGB II and
SGB XII occurred, see Appendix A.
2.2.3 Expected reform eects on the rate of non-take-up
Against the background of the far-reaching SA reforms described above and high RNTs
during the years prior to the reforms, several arguments point to a decline in the RNT
of SA (SGB II and SGB XII) after 2004.
First, the implementation of the reform was preceded by an intense public debate about
claiming conditions and means-testing as well as information campaigns by the public
labour agencies and other institutions like unions. This should have increased the
awareness about the programme and eligibility and thus take-up of SA. Second, the
reforms should have reduced stigmatisation of SA recipients, since the structure of the
population eligible for SA changed substantially. Prior to the reform, a typical person
eligible to SA either never participated in the labour market or was only marginally
employed in the past. Hence, the old SA was widely regarded as a basic safety net
for a fringe group of society and dependency on SA was perceived as stigmatising
(Becker/Hauser, 2005: p. 175). Since 2005, all workers whose UB entitlements are
exhausted can become dependent on SA, even if they look back on a work history
of many years of full-time employment. This may have led to a shift in the public
attitude towards SA after the reform, i.e. the perception that anyone can become
dependent on SA should have reduced stigmatisation and therefore increased the take-
up of SA. Third, take-up of former UA recipients with an additional SA entitlement
may have increased. On the one hand, as argued above, claiming SA was stigmatised
in the old system, while UA was regarded as an unemployment insurance system and
consequently had relatively low stigma costs. Accordingly, former UA recipients had
a strong incentive to make ends meet with only claiming UA, despite the fact that
household income was below the guaranteed level of SA. On the other hand, since
UA was abolished with the 2005 reform, a previous UA recipient who does not claim
SA under the new system would typically suer a substantial decrease in disposable
income. Finally, under the old administrative arrangements, some households had to
apply for three benets simultaneously (UA, housing benets and SA) in three dierent
(non-cooperating) benet agencies to reach the guaranteed income level. After 2005,
the process of applying for benets was simplied signicantly, since most households
only had to apply for one type of benet (typically SA), which should increase take-up
of SA.11
11 If a household applies for SA under the new system, a standard administrative check is performed,
whether the household is eligible to prioritised benets (housing benets and enhanced child benet).
If this is the case and the prioritised benet entitlements exceed the SA benet, the household is
referred to the prioritised benet agencies.
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above suggests, since there are also arguments for an adverse reform eect on the
RNT. For example, given the complex and far-reaching nature of the reforms, it seems
plausible that { at least initially { there was a high level of uncertainty about the new
eligibility conditions and claiming procedures, which might have increased the RNT.
Furthermore, previous UA recipients who are now eligible to SGB II benets arguably
have a stronger attachment to the labour market and possibly also a higher aversion to
claim SA than persons eligible to SA under the old system. Thus, the overall reform
eect on the RNT is theoretically ambiguous and has to be determined empirically.
3 Non-take-up 2005-2007
3.1 Measuring non-take-up
In order to determine the non-take-up of eligible households we rst have to simulate
eligibility. For this purpose we employ the IAB-STSM microsimulation model. The
model allows us to simulate household-specic net incomes, including tax burdens and
transfers given information on household characteristics, gross labour income, pensions,
rental and capital income taken from the data. The model includes eligibility tests for
the most important means-tested benets in Germany, i.e. housing benets, enhanced
child benets and SA for employable and non-employable persons.12 In contrast to our
approach, most empirical studies on non-take-up do not simulate net income using a
microsimulation model of the whole tax and transfer system. Instead, these studies
simply take reported net income from the data and deduct the reported SA payments
to obtain net income excluding SA transfers (see e.g. Riphahn, 2001; Wilde/Kubis,
2005; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007). An important advantage of using a microsimulation
model is that we can simulate transfers prioritised over means-tested SA, i.e. housing
benets and enhanced child benets. This makes our simulation of non-take-up of SA
more precise because some non-take-up households may be eligible for these prioritised
transfers.13 In order to conform to previous studies and to make our ndings com-
parable to results obtained before 2005 we will focus on both programmes { SA for
the long-term unemployed (SGB II) and for older or unemployable people (SGB XII).
Eligibility to SA is given if the household's total needs exceed the allowable income and
the household's wealth remains below the household-specic maximum.
The IAB-STSM is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel data set (GSOEP).
GSOEP is a representative panel data set of private households in Germany.14 One
advantage of the GSOEP for this study is that it contains detailed information on
households' income and wealth. Households report their monthly net income at the
12 For an overview of the basic features of the microsimulation model and a description of the eligibility
simulation within the model, see Appendix B and Steiner et al. (2008).
13 Figure 2 in Appendix B describes the algorithm for determining eligibility for the relevant transfers
(housing benets, enhanced child benets and SA for employable and non-employable persons) in
the IAB-STSM.
14 A documentation of the GSOEP can be found in Haisken-DeNew/Frick (2005).
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ing the last year. The GSOEP contains information for the incomes received in every
month of the last year. Similarly, receipt of SA is reported for the month of the inter-
view and for every month of the year before the interview. This allows us to determine
non-take-up of SA over two dierent periods (monthly and annual non-take-up). Non-
take-up based on monthly incomes describes households which are eligible in the month
of the interview and do not claim their entitlement in this month. This measure ne-
glects the duration of non-take-up, but encompasses short periods of non-take-up as
well as households which suer from long-lasting periods of poverty and do not claim
their entitlements. Furthermore, households could be considered eligible based on their
annual average income.15 We refer to these two measures as temporary non-take-up,
if based on monthly data and persistent non-take-up, if based on a household's annual
income.
In our analysis, a household has to pass two thresholds to be regarded as a persistent
non-take-up household. First, our microsimulation model has to classify the household
as eligible for SA. We choose annual average retrospective incomes to calculate eligi-
bility. Conditional on being eligible, a household is classied as a persistent take-up
household, if it claims SA for more than six months, otherwise it is a non-take-up
household. This denition of persistent non-take-up follows international standards of
assessing the working poor where the most frequent activity status during one year and
annual income are used, see e.g. Pe~ na-Casas/Latta (2004).16
From a social policy perspective, temporary non-take-up may be seen as a less severe
problem than non-take-up over a longer time period, especially if temporary non-take-
up households move between dierent income states, e.g. because they nd a new job
and suer from non-take-up for only a short period of time. Nevertheless, non-take-up
of SA over shorter periods than a year is also relevant to social policy. Studies on
poverty dynamics in Germany show that poverty persistence in Germany is relatively
low within the OECD-17 (Valletta, 2006; Oxley/Dang/Antol n, 2000). The analysis
of Biewen (2006) suggests that about one third of cross-section poverty in Germany
is chronic. For these reasons, and also to assess the sensitivity of our results to our
specication of non-take-up, we report results on RNTs for both measures.
3.2 Simulating eligibility
Our analysis is based on annual data for the years 2005 to 2007 collected in the three
survey years 2006 to 2008. In 2006 (2007, 2008), the GSOEP contained information on
11,440 (12,499, 11,689) households. Certain limitations apply to the data set, such as
missing information on income variables, housing costs or receipt of SA. A description
of the selection mechanism is given in Appendix B. We end up with a simulation sample
of 8,685 (8,981, 8,408) households for the year 2005 (2006, 2007).
15 Eligibility in this sense only implies that households are eligible on average over the year. Thus, it
does not necessarily imply that a household is eligible in each month of the year.
16 Appendix C examines the sensitivity of non-take-up to the specication of the claiming threshold.
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measure the income and needs of the household, whereas SGB II as well as SGB XII
refer to the household community. The household community is dened by the core
family of the head of the household, her spouse and children under 25 years of age.
Since the core family is typically identical with the household we do not expect that
this assumption has a strong eect on our results.
SA in our analysis includes SA for the long-term unemployed (SGB II) and for older
or unemployable people (SGB XII). Since the eligibility requirements of SGB II and
SGB XII are similar, the following description refers to both programmes.
Total needs are determined by the legally dened regular needs of the members of the
household, additional needs and housing costs. We use the national standardised regular
benets for the head of the household, her partner and children to calculate regular
needs of the household. Furthermore, we consider national standardised benets for
additional needs of single parents and disabled people. For single parents, the additional
benets are calculated as a function of the number and age of the children. The data
also contains information on the degree of disability for the head of the household. We
use this information to calculate disability benets for those with a degree of disability
of more than 30%. Other additional benets are provided, if the recipient is pregnant or
in need of special nutrition for health reasons. We have no information in the GSOEP
to consider these two additional benets. However, the take-up of these additional
benets is very low and we believe that disregarding them will not alter our results
distinctly.17 For tenants, housing costs are the monthly rent and the heating costs of
the household. Both are reported in the GSOEP and can be taken from the data.
Housing costs for home-owners consist of interest payments for home ownership and
ancillary costs as reported by the head of the household.
Household income consists of all individual incomes of the household members, includ-
ing earned income, self-employed income, capital income, rental income and pensions.
From these incomes, social security contributions and income taxes are deducted. We
also calculate benets prioritised over SA, in particular unemployment benets, child
benets, as well as housing and children's allowance. The calculation of the SA enti-
tlement accounts for income exemptions according to the legal denition.18
Previous studies have shown that considering wealth can have a strong impact on
RNT simulations (Whelan, 2010; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Becker/Hauser, 2005).
Unfortunately, detailed wealth data in the GSOEP have only been collected for the
survey years 2002 and 2007. The missing information for the years 2005 and 2006 is
replaced by linear interpolations using the data from the years 2002 and 2007. We
calculate households' total wealth as the sum of the individual assets and compare it
to the household-specic allowable maximum wealth. This wealth exemption refers to
the nancial wealth only and is clearly dened by SGB II and SGB XII (see Table 6
17 In 2007 about 2.3% of all SA-recipients received additional benets for a special nutrition and about
0.9% for pregnancy (Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit, 2008).
18 See Appendix A for a discussion of the exemption rules.
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because the available information on the household's assets does not allow us to dis-
tinguish clearly between assets serving only old-age provision and other assets. If the
household's assets exceed the household-specic maximum wealth, the household is not
eligible for SA. Since we include all nancial assets reported in the sample but disregard
exemptions for old-age-provision, our wealth check is too restrictive. For this reason
we also provide results on non-take-up without considering a wealth check.
3.3 Empirical evidence on non-take-up after 2004
The above description of the eligibility simulation shows that identifying SA eligibility
as well as non-take-up requires many assumptions. Available studies on non-take-
up dier not only in the data set used: since there is no \correct" set of assumption,
previous studies also dier in the particular choice of assumptions made for determining
eligibility and take-up. Results on non-take-up from dierent studies are therefore only
broadly comparable. Additionally, most of the previous studies focus on non-take-up in
one particular year only. This and the lack of comparability between dierent studies
makes it dicult to determine time trends on non-take-up.
In contrast, our analysis reveals results on the development of non-take-up over a period
of three years, since we calculate take-up by homogenous procedures for the GSOEP
data sets of every year. Since the SGB II and SGB XII rules that determine eligibility
hardly changed between 2005 and 2007, the results are not biased by applying dierent
simulation procedures every year. The resulting RNTs for our two alternative measures
of non-take-up for the period between 2005 and 2007 are shown in Table 2. The RNT
is dened by the ratio of all eligible households that do not take up their benets to
the total number of eligible households.
Table 2: Rates of persistent and temporary non-take-up of social assistance 2005-2007
Year 2005 2006 2007
Non-take-up rate (persistent) 48.85 41.73 41.31
C. I. [44.40 - 53.29] [37.67 - 45.77] [37.72 - 45.37]
Non-take-up rate (temporary) 58.41 47.91 45.80
C. I. [53.87 - 62.95] [43.35 - 52.47] [41.65 - 49.95]
Note: Non-take-up rates in per cent. C. I.: Bootstrapped 95%-condence intervals.
Source: GSOEP years 2005-2007, IAB-STSM.
Our results based on annual (monthly) incomes indicate that about 49% (58%) of
eligible households did not claim their entitlements in 2005. The RNT declines to 42%
(48%) in 2006 and 41% (46%) in 2007. Thus, the drop in the RNT in 2006 is robust to
our choice of take-up measure.19 Also, regardless of whether we use our temporary or
19 We checked whether the drop in the take-up rate could simply reect a change in the structure of
the underlying population of eligible households between 2005 and 2006. Table 14 in Appendix D
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previous studies, even for the year 2005. The latest pre-reform study on non-take-up
of SA reported a RNT of 67% for the year 2003 (Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007).
Table 2 also shows that the temporary RNTs are approximately 10 percentage points
higher than the respective persistent RNTs. Intuitively, the temporary measure of non-
take-up captures more households which are only eligible for a short period of time than
the permanent measure. These households will typically have better (earned) income
expectations and hence a higher RNT than households which suer from long-lasting
periods of income below the guaranteed level.
Since the literature on take-up behaviour shows that RNTs can vary substantially when
alternative assumptions about assets are made (Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Whelan,
2010), we checked the sensitivity of our results to important assumptions of our eligi-
bility simulation and the selection of our model sample. The results of the sensitivity
analysis are provided in Appendix C. They reveal that our main results, a low RNT
relative to previous studies and a drop after 2005, are robust to various alternative
assumptions.
Summing up, the simulations suggest that RNTs have declined after 2004 as a result of
the reform. Furthermore, the drop of the RNT from 2005 to 2006 cannot be explained
by changes in the composition of the eligible population. Given a constant composition
of the eligible households, this drop may be explained by a change in the take-up
behaviour between 2005 and 2006. We return to this point in the next section in which
we estimate an empirical model of take-up behaviour.
4 Regression analysis of non-take-up of social assistance
4.1 A model of take-up
The previous section shows that RNTs of SA have declined but are still substantially
high since the introduction of Hartz IV. In this section we extend the analysis of non-
take-up to a multivariate framework in order to test hypotheses on claiming behaviour.
In general, the decision by an eligible household not to take up a benet can be in-
terpreted as an indication that the costs of claiming outweigh the utility from the
additional income for that particular household. Discussion of the costs of claiming SA
often hinges on factors which are unobservable and in most cases only loosely dened.
For example, the lack of knowledge of the benets available, insucient knowledge
about the claiming process, fear of stigmatisation or shame associated with claiming a
benet, or attitudes towards dependency on society are put forward as potential cost
factors (van Oorschot, 1991). Thus, in order to be able to model take-up, an analysis
shows that the structure of the households eligible to SA (SGB II and SGB XII) { measured by the
means of possible determinants of take-up { does not vary substantially across the years. Thus, we
nd no evidence for changes in the composition of the eligible population that might explain a lower
non-take-up rate in 2006.
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the decision of taking up SA is required.
In line with Mott (1983), recent studies on non-take-up typically model the claiming
behaviour in a discrete choice framework (see e.g. Blundell/Fry/Walker, 1988; Riphahn,
2001; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Whelan, 2010). In this frame-
work, take-up (P = 1) will be observed if the net level of utility from claiming the
benet exceeds the utility from not claiming the benet, i.e.
P = I(U (y + b(y;x);x)   C (x) > U (y;x)); (1)
where I() designates the indicator function. U () denotes utility, y is net income
(excluding the benet), b  b(y;x) = b(x) ty y is the benet entitlement depending
on household characteristics x, the maximum level of benets b(x) and household
transfers prioritised over means-tested SA, ty. The disutility from claiming, C (x),
depends on net income and the characteristics x determining take-up. In addition to
the observed characteristics, there are likely to be unobserved characteristics aecting
take-up. Assuming linear forms for U () and C (x), we have
U (y + b(y;x);x) = 0 + 1 (y + b) + 0
2x + "T  UT;
U (y;x) = 0 + 1y + 0
2x + "0  U0; (2)
 C (x) = 0 + 0
2x+;
where "T, "0,  denote the household-specic unobservables and  =(0;1;2),
 =(0;2) are coecient vectors. From (1), it follows that
P = I
 




with   "T   "0 + . Thus, the probability of observing take-up is given by




0 + 1b + 0
2x









with F () the cumulative distribution function of .
Up to this point, the model assumes the benet entitlement b to be exogenous. This
assumption is likely to be violated, since unobserved factors which inuence the take-
up decision are possibly correlated with earned income y and thus benets b(y;x).
For example, unobserved motivation to work or attitudes towards SA likely have an
inuence on programme take-up as well as earned income and therefore on the level
of the benet. This suggests an instrumental variable estimator to account for the
potential endogeneity of b. Rewriting (3) and assuming the error terms to be distributed
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0
1x + 0
2z+2; (5)






where we model the benet as a linear function of x and additional instruments z. We
estimate model (5) using the maximum likelihood approach.20 While most studies on
take-up behaviour build on a similar theoretical setup, the potential endogeneity of b is
seldom accounted for. Exceptions are Wilde/Kubis (2005), who estimate the take-up
and the labour supply equation simultaneously, and Whelan (2010), who also uses the
instrumental variable approach given in model (5).
4.2 Proxies for utility and costs of claiming social assistance
In order to estimate model (5), we rst have to identify suitable proxies for the utility
from and costs of claiming SA. The literature on take-up behaviour suggests that the
utility from claiming SA depends positively on the amount of the SA entitlement of
the household (see e.g. Mott, 1983; Blundell/Fry/Walker, 1988). In a dynamic per-
spective, utility from claiming SA also depends positively on the perceived duration of
benet receipt. One example is Anderson/Meyer (1997), where households claim UB
if benets exceed costs throughout the expected duration of unemployment. Costs, on
the other hand, can be disaggregated into information costs (insucient knowledge or
false interpretation of entitlement rules, insucient knowledge of the claiming process
or of administrative procedures, diculties in lling in forms or gathering the necessary
information) and stigma costs (fear of stigmatisation, negative attitudes towards de-
pendency on society), see van Oorschot (1991). Table 3 shows the proxies on utility and
costs of claiming, where we build on existing literature in choosing the variables (see
Riphahn, 2001; Becker/Hauser, 2005; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007).
We use the SA benet available to the household as the most obvious proxy for utility
from claiming SA. The available benet is dened as the amount of SA the household is
eligible for according to our microsimulation model. A number of additional household
characteristics can be used to approximate the utility from claiming SA pertaining to
the degree of needs. Both singles and households with children (single parents and
couples) are assumed to be in more urgent need of help than couples without children,
since, on the one hand, the absence of a partner removes a source of potential income
for the household and, on the other hand, children represent dependants for whom
the parents are responsible. This holds in particular if small children (aged three and
below) are present in the household. On the other hand, older children (aged 15 and
above) may reduce the degree of needs as well as the perceived duration of needs. A
higher degree of needs is hypothesised for households with members in need of care,
particularly if the head of the household is disabled. From a dynamic perspective, these
household characteristics will also tend to increase the duration of needs, along with
the variables \head of household retired", \age" (where we also include squared age to
20 See e.g. Wooldridge (2002) for details of the estimation of discrete choice models with continuous
endogenous regressors.
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Calculated monthly benet (cont.) + +
Singles (ref.: couple without children) + + +
Single parents (ref.: couple without children) + + - +
Families with children (ref.: couple without
children)
+ + ?
Number of young children (age<=3years, cont.) + + +
Number of older children (age>14years, cont.) - - -
Head of HH retired + + + ?
Disability of head of HH + + - +
High qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm. qual.) - - ?
Low qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm. qual.) + + ?
Age, age
2 (cont.) + + + ?
Male head of HH + -
Foreign national head of HH + + -
Rural area (ref.: interm. area) + + + ?
Metropolitan area (ref.: interm. area) - - - ?
Eastern Germany + + +
Home owner household - + -
Note: Column \eect" indicates the expected eect of the respective variable on the probability of
claiming SA. A \+" sign in the utility columns corresponds to a positive expected eect on the
probability of take-up, while a \+" sign in the cost columns has the opposite eect (vice versa for \-"
signs). A \?" stands for an ambiguous overall eect. \HH" stands for household.
capture nonlinear eects of age) and \low qualied household" (relating to the head of
the household, respectively), since these households are likely to have a lower chance
of income increases from employment.
Note that according to Table 3 we assume many of the utility proxies to have an impact
on the cost of take-up, too. In some cases (e.g. \single parents" or \disabled head of
household") the assumed eect on information and/or stigma costs works in the same
direction as the eects on utility. In the case of single parents we assume lower stigma
costs, since single parents may perceive themselves as being more needy than couples,
who can share the burden of work and childcare. For this reason we expect these
variables to have an unambiguous impact on the likelihood of take-up. This is not the
case for variables like \age" or \qualication", implying that we are agnostic about the
sign of these coecients. Additional variables, which should mainly be related to the
costs of claiming SA, are\sex of the head of household"(higher social stigma for males),
\area of living" (rural or metropolitan relative to intermediate area, where stigma in
rural areas should be higher because of higher social control), a dummy for living in
eastern Germany and for home owners. We hypothesise a positive relationship between
living in eastern Germany and the degree and duration of needs, which should mainly
reect a worse labour market situation than in western Germany. Home owners, on the
other hand, are likely to need SA for a shorter period than non-owners, if the earning
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being forced to sell her home may detain her from claiming SA. The last column of
Table 3 shows the expected eect of the variables on the probability of claiming SA.
4.3 Estimation results
In the following we apply the model of take-up behaviour to the persistent non-take-up
measure.21 The estimation of model (5) requires the choice of suitable instruments
to take account of the potential endogeneity of the level of SA. We choose the level
of household income independent of the current choice of labour supply (including
pension, widow's pension, child benets, maternity allowance and rental income) as
well as the maximum level of benets excluding housing costs. First, these instruments
are determinants in the computation of the level of SA and thus satisfy the requirement
of an instrument to be correlated with the endogenous variable. Second, both of these
instruments are arguably not correlated with unobserved factors determining the take-
up decision.
Both instruments turn out to be important determinants of the level of SA.22 Since we
have one instrument more than required to identify the rst equation of (5), we also
test the overidentifying restriction. The null of both instruments being uncorrelated
with the error term 1 in (5) cannot be rejected.23
The results of the instrumental variable (IV) probit estimation for the pooled data are
given in Table 4 along with a probit estimation which does not correct for a potential
endogeneity bias of the level of SA.24 Consistent estimation of the IV probit model
(5) requires joint normality and homoscedasticity of the residuals 1 and 2, which
is dicult to test, since the residual 1 is not operational. For this reason we also
perform a 2SLS estimation of the model (also included in Table 4), which does not
impose the normality or the homoscedasticity assumption on the error terms. For ease
of interpretation we present the marginal eects of all specications. The estimated
correlation between the error terms 1 and 2 is  = 0:24 in the IV probit with a robust
standard error of 0:11, suggesting a positive relation between the unobservable factors
which determine the probability of claiming SA and the level of calculated benets. The
Wald test reported in Table 4 rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the calculated
SA benets at the 10% level.25
21 Appendix C presents results for the temporary measure of non-take-up. Both, persistent and tem-
porary take-up, lead to similar results.
22 A linear regression of the second equation of model (5) gives an R
2 of 0:30. Both instruments are
highly signicant (p < 0:001), where we compute heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. A test
of both instruments being jointly zero is strongly rejected (F (2;2552) = 71:48, p < 0:0001).
23 The Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum 
2 statistic (Lee, 1992) is 
2 (1) = 0:04, which corresponds with
a p-value of 0:95. Additionally, Wooldridge's (1995) robust score test of overidentifying restrictions
gives 
2(1) = :059 (p = 0:81) for the 2SLS estimation. Note that tests on overidentifying restrictions
simultaneously test the null hypothesis of a correctly specied model. Thus, the tests cannot reject
the validity of the instruments as well as the specication of the structural equation.
24 Mean values of the covariates used in the regression are given in Table 13 in Appendix D.
25 For the 2SLS estimation, Wooldridge's (1995) robust score test also rejects the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of the calculated SA benets (
2(1) = 5:55, p = 0:018).
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Probit IV Probit 2SLS RE
Calculated monthly benet (in 100e) .07597 .05790 .05987 .04762
Single .03060 .01886 .03624 .01148
Single parent .00905 .05312 .07363 .06022
Family with children -.00858 .03466 .02647 .03640
Number of young children (age<=3
years)
.09307 .11080 .09538 .06593
Number of older children (age>14 years) -.05880 -.04962 -.06978 -.04977
Head of HH retired -.06134 -.13985 -.14988 -.11485
Disability of head of HH -.02636 -.03437 -.02574 .00016
High qual. head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
-.10925 -.11653 -.11557 -.10540
Low qual. head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
.01368 .03137 .02158 .04267
Age .00370 .00511 .00510 .00441
Male head of HH .04349 .05708 .05646 .05759
Foreign national head of HH -.02842 -.01634 -.01004 -.00042
Rural area (ref.: interm. area) .00568 .00275 .00569 .02518
Metropolitan area (ref.: interm. area) -.04441 -.04358 -.04366 -.02824
Eastern Germany .13166 .13999 .14076 .16341
Home owner household -.08054 -.12156 -.11510 -.14964
Dummy 2006 .05244 .06131 .04889 .04612
Dummy 2007 .05171 .05451 .04012 .04008
Observations 2573 2573 2573 2573
Wald test of exogeneity: 2(1) 3.75
(Pseudo)R2 0.307 0.405 0.327
Note: Pooled estimation using GSOEP years 2005 - 2007.
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01. \HH"
stands for household.
The main variable of interest is the eect of the calculated benet on take-up behaviour,
b. The marginal eect of b in the probit model implies that an increase of 100e per
month in SA increases the probability of take-up by 7:6 percentage points. Taking ac-
count of the endogeneity of calculated SA reduces the marginal eect by 1:8 percentage
points relative to the simple probit model. The size of the estimated marginal eect is
in line with the literature (see e.g. Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Whelan, 2010). While
the dummies on family status (singles, single parents, families) are insignicant in both
(probit and IV probit) specications, the number of infants in the household has { as
expected { a strong positive impact on the probability of take-up, while the opposite
holds for children older than 14 years. For retired heads of household we hypothesised
that the impact on utility and costs work in the opposite direction. The estimation
suggests that on average the presumed higher stigma costs for pensioners outweigh
their higher duration of needs. We were also agnostic about the eect of qualication
on take-up behaviour. It turns out that being highly qualied signicantly (1% level)
reduces the probability of take-up, while there is no dierence between low qualied
and intermediately qualied heads of household. For male heads of household we hy-
pothesised higher stigma costs, since we assume higher social pressure for males to
support themselves and the members of their family. Contrary to our expectations,
we nd a signicantly positive eect of being a male head of household on the take-up
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is signicant at the 1% level, with a remarkably high marginal eect on the take-up
probability: living in eastern Germany increases the probability by almost 14 percent-
age points in the IV probit model. This nding does not necessarily imply a higher
propensity to claim SA, but may simply reect worse labour market conditions than
in western Germany. Furthermore, the dummy for home owners shows an expected
negative eect on the probability of claiming SA. Finally, the year dummies show that
the probability of take-up was signicantly higher in 2006 and 2007 than in the year
when the Hartz IV reform was introduced.27
The marginal eects for the 2SLS estimation are reassuringly consistent with the IV
probit estimates. The marginal eect of b is nearly identical to the eect in the IV probit
estimation. The only deviation is the coecient on single parents, which is signicant
in the 2SLS estimation but neither in the IV probit nor in the probit estimation.
The rst three estimations presented in Table 4 are based on the pooled GSOEP years
2005 to 2007. Pooled estimation implicitly assumes independent cross-section samples.
Since the GSOEP is a panel, this assumption seems highly unrealistic. Our 2;573
pooled observations are formed by 320 households entering the estimation in all three
years, 413 households which are eligible for SA in two waves and 787 households which
are eligible only once. Therefore, as a nal robustness check, we also estimate a linear
random eects IV panel model for the take-up behaviour. For this purpose the rst
equation of model (5) is modied to
Pit = I
 




where Pit denotes the SA take-up dummy with household index i and time index t
and i is the household-specic residual. Again, the computed amount of SA benet,
bit, is assumed to be endogenous. We choose the random eects (RE) model over the
xed eects (FE) model for the following reasons. First, and most importantly, most
of our regressors show little to no variation over time, rendering the FE estimator
inappropriate, since it analyses variation within households over time. Second, since
the FE estimator uses time-demeaned data, all households eligible in only one period
drop out of the analysis. Thus, not surprisingly, a linear FE panel model has very little
explanatory power for our data. On the other hand, while consistent estimation of the
FE model is possible for arbitrary correlation between the household-specic error term
i and all explanatory variables, the RE model requires i to be uncorrelated with xt
26 As opposed to the other coecients, the eect of male head of household is not stable over time.
Estimating the model for each of the three waves separately reveals that the positive coecient on
male head of household is highly signicant in 2005 (1% level), signicant at the 10% level in 2006
and insignicant in 2007.
27 Estimating model (5) for each year of the period 2005 to 2007 separately reveals that the level
and signicance of the marginal eects are relatively stable over this time period. Alternatively,
we interacted all covariates with the time dummies for 2006 and 2007. Only three interactions are
signicant on the 5% level (sex of head of household with 2006 dummy, low qualied and age with
2007 dummy). This suggests that take-up behaviour has been stable with respect to our proxy
variables over our three-year period.
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\RE" of Table 4 shows that the marginal eects in the random eects linear IV panel
model are reasonably close to the eects in the pooled 2SLS as well as in the IV probit
estimation, which suggests that the bias from ignoring the xed eects i is rather
small.
Summing up, the regression results on the determinants of take-up in Table 4 reveal
that the degree of needs, measured as the SA benet level households are entitled to,
the number of small children in the household as well as the expected duration of benet
receipt, expressed in proxy variables like qualication, living in eastern Germany, or
age, are the key-determinants of the take-up decision. On the other hand, proxies which
mainly measure stigmatisation and information costs only seem to play a minor role in
the take-up decision. Furthermore, a simple probit estimation, which does not account
for the potential endogeneity of the level of SA benets available to eligible households,
seems to overestimate the eect of the benet level on the probability to take up SA.
The estimation results are remarkably robust against dierent estimation approaches
(nonlinear versus linear, pooled versus panel). Finally, the largest part of the drop
in the RNT from 2005 to 2006 (or 2007, respectively) is explained by year dummies.
Hence, our proxies do not capture a change in take-up behaviour after 2005 and we can
only speculate on the cause of the drop in the RNT in 2006. One possible explanation
for the drop is that SA-eligible households took about a year to familiarise themselves
with the new policy regime.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide rst results on rates of non-take-up (RNTs) of social assis-
tance (SA) in Germany after major social policy reforms were implemented in 2005.
We measure non-take-up using two concepts: persistent non-take-up, which focuses
on households with an annual income below the guaranteed minimum income, and
temporary non-take-up, which considers households eligible to SA in the month of the
interview.
For 2005, the rst post-reform year, we nd that about 49% (58%) of all eligible house-
holds did not claim their SA entitlements persistently (temporarily). Our simulated
temporary RNT is in the lower range of pre-reform results. For 2006 and 2007 we nd
signicantly lower persistent (temporary) RNTs of about 41% (46%). Our ndings pro-
vide prima facie evidence that the non-take-up of SA was signicantly reduced by the
2005 reform of social assistance in Germany. The literature on SA non-take-up points
out the sensitivity of simulated RNTs to several assumptions and data restrictions. Our
RNTs turn out to be robust to sensitivity tests with respect to the wealth check, the
data selection process and the denition of persistent take-up.
28 A Hausman test cannot reject the hypothesis of equal coecients in the RE and FE models, but
this seems to be largely caused by the highly imprecise estimation of coecients in the FE model
and should not be taken as conrmation that the assumption E (ijxt;zt) = 0 is met in the data.
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of take-up behaviour. The estimations reveal that the degree of needs, measured as
the SA benet level households are entitled to and the expected duration of benet
receipt, expressed in proxy variables like qualication, residing in eastern Germany,
or age, are the key determinants of the take-up decision. Furthermore, stigmatisation
and information costs do not seem to play a decisive role in determining the decision
to take up SA. These ndings are in line with the previous literature. When we take
into account the potential endogeneity of the level of SA benets, the results of the
instrumental variable regression analysis indicate that the positive eect of the benet
level on the probability of taking up SA is overestimated in a simple probit framework.
The estimations also show that the inuence of the determinants of take-up as well as
the composition of the eligible population is stable over the period 2005 to 2007 and
thus cannot explain the drop in the RNT in 2006. Instead, the drop is mainly reected
in signicant year dummies in the estimation and can therefore be interpreted as an
(unobserved) higher propensity to take up SA after 2005. Thus, we can only speculate
on the cause of the drop in the RNT in 2006. One possible explanation for the drop
is that eligible households took about a year to adapt to the new policy in the form of
higher take-up rates.
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Appendices
A Reorganisation of the means-tested benet system in
Germany
During the years 2002 and 2005 the German government implemented a package of
comprehensive social and labour market reforms. The most far-reaching reforms were
the so called \Hartz" reforms, implemented in the years 2003-2005. They aimed at
activating the long-term unemployed by increasing work incentives and employment
in the low-wage sector. Other goals of the reform were the improvement of active
labour market policies and an increasing eectiveness and eciency of labour market
IAB-Discussion Paper 10/2011 23services. In the course of the reform process, the whole system of means-tested benets
in Germany was reorganised. Figure 1 describes the changes in the social system, while
Table 6 gives an overview of important features of the old and new systems.




























Social assistance for 
older persons (439) 
Social assistance for 







Social assistance and 
housing benefits for 
employable per-
sons: SGB II (7,101) 
Social assistance and 
housing benefits for 
older or  not 
employable persons:  
SGB XII (710) 























































In 2002 three major systems of social assistance (SA) existed beside the system of social
insurance in Germany. The social insurance system includes the federal pension and
health insurance as well as the federal unemployment insurance. Eligibility to unem-
ployment insurance benets depends on the number of months of employment subject
to social security contributions the unemployed person accumulates during the qualify-
ing period, which is usually the last 3 years (2 years since 2004) before unemployment.
Claimants have to accumulate a minimum of 12 months of insurable employment to be
entitled to receive benets. Typically unemployment insurance benets are paid for a
period of 12 months.
Until 2004 unemployment assistance (UA) benets were available if unemployment
insurance benets had been exhausted. UA benets were prioritised over SA. Since
the benet level was calculated as a percentage of previous earnings, recipients could
receive UA below the guaranteed income level. Thus, it was possible to claim UA,
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able for anyone with low income and high costs of housing. In 2002 SA was the basic
safety net for all poor households. A large share of recipients were the long-term unem-
ployed, single parents, or the only partially employable. UA, housing benets and SA
were administered by dierent federal agencies. While UA was granted by the federal
employment agencies, housing benets were administered by special oces at the level
of the 16 German states. SA could be claimed at SA oces, which acted on behalf
of the German municipalities. One major goal of the reforms was to make all of the
long-term unemployed subject to the same law. Accordingly, the former UA and SA
were combined to the new SA for needy employable people (SGB II) in 2005.
The new SA benet system only distinguishes between employable and non-employable
persons. The former are subject to Book II (SGB II), the latter to Book XII of the
Social Code (SGB XII). SGB II and SGB XII include benets for living as well as
housing costs. For this reason the receipt of SA and housing benets cannot coincide
after 2005, and housing benets are prioritised over SGB II and SGB XII. The means
tests in both systems are similar. With more than 7 million recipients during the year
2005 the SGB II is the most important benet system (see Table 5). A new enhanced
child benet for low-income families was also implemented in 2005. The enhanced child
benet and housing benets can be claimed simultaneously.
Table 5: Recipients of social assistance for the long-term unemployed (SGB II) and
older or unemployable persons (SGB XII) 2005-2008





Note: Number of recipients in 1,000 at the end of the respective year.
Changes in eligibility conditions between 2005 and 2007 Between 2005 and
2007 some minor changes in the rules determining eligibility and the benet level were
implemented. For example, in 2006 the standard benet level for individuals living
in eastern Germany was adjusted to the level of the standard benet level of western
Germany. The level of the new national standard benet in SGB II and SGB XII
increased slightly from 345e to 347e in 2007. We believe that these minor changes
had no signicant eect on the take-up of entitlements. An important exception was the
reform of the SGB II earned income exemption in October 2005. When the SGB II was
introduced in 2005, the rules that dened the earned income exemptions were complex
and they increased the incentives to take up low-paid jobs only slightly compared to the
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of working SGB II households.29
B Description of the microsimulation model
This appendix gives a concise overview of the main features of the employed microsim-
ulation model, the IAB-STSM. The acronym stands for\Tax-Transfer Microsimulation
Model of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency". The IAB-STSM is based on the Steuer-Transfer-Mikrosimulationsmodell
(STSM) of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (see Jacobebbing-
haus/Steiner (2003) for a documentation of the STSM). The IAB-STSM is a static
microsimulation model which consists of a detailed implementation of the German tax
and transfer system as well as an econometrically estimated labour supply model. It is
used to analyse the eects of taxes, social contributions and transfers on income and
labour supply of private households in Germany. In recent years the main eld of ap-
plication of the IAB-STSM was the ex ante evaluation of social policy reforms directed
at low-income households in Germany (Arntz et al., 2007; Wiemers/Bruckmeier, 2009).
Data The model is based on micro data of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP)30. The current version of the IAB-STSM employs GSOEP wave 2008, which
gives information on 11,000 households with more than 21,000 persons aged 17 and
older. The GSOEP includes the required demographic variables, information on in-
comes of persons and households (e.g. earned income, pensions, capital income, etc.)
as well as information on current and past worked hours. In each wave of the GSOEP,
about 80 % of the households are interviewed in the rst four months of a year
(Steiner/Haan/Wrohlich, 2005). As a consequence, the tax-transfer module of the
IAB-STSM computes net household income based on retrospective information on the
previous year, which also implies that the tax and transfer regulations of the previous
year are used. Thus, e.g., the simulation year 2007 is based on the GSOEP wave 2008.
29 For the rst nine months of 2005 the following regulation for determining monthly income exemptions
(IE) was in place:
IE =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
y if 0  y < d
d + 0:15 q (y)(y   d) if d  y < 400
d + 53:2 q (y) + 0:3 q (y)(y   400) if 400  y < 900
d + 203:2 q (y) + 0:15 q (y)(y   900) if 900  y < 1500
d + 293:2 q (y) if 1500  y
;
where y is gross monthly income in Euro and d are at income-related expenses of 45.33e per month.
The function q (y) = (y   d   T (y))=y gives the net income to gross income ratio, where T (y) is
the sum of social security contributions and income taxes. We use this regulation for determining
eligibility in 2005. Since October 2005 recipients can earn a gross income of 100 e per month before
their welfare benets are reduced. For earnings above 100e per month the benet reduction rate
amounts to 80%. Above 800e per month it is increased to 90%. Earnings above a threshold of
1,200e (1,500e for recipients with children) per month reduce the benets at a rate of 100%. For
example, an SGB II recipient with monthly earned income of 400e has income exemptions of 160e
under the new rule, while the exemptions amounted to only 92.50e under the old rule.
30 See Haisken-DeNew/Frick (2005) and Wagner/Frick/Schupp (2007) for documentation of the
GSOEP.
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Unemployment assistance 2004 Social assistance 2004 Social assistance (SGB II) 2005 Social assistance (SGB XII) 2005
Target group needy long-term unemployed
individuals




Objective preservation of living standards guaranteeing a minimum income guaranteeing a minimum income guaranteeing a minimum income
Calculation of benet 53% of previous net earnings (57%
for workers with children)
regionally diering standard
benets + additional benets due
to special needs + single payments
for variable costs + housing costs
nationally standardised regular benets + additional benets due to special
needs + housing costs
Basic benet, head of the
household (HH)
295e per month (national
average)
345e (331e) per month western (eastern) Germany
Basic benet for household
members (in per cent of basic
benet for the HH)
spouse: 80%, children aged < 7
(15, 18): 50% (65%, 90%)
spouse: 80%, children aged <14 (>13): 60% (80%)
Incomes in the means-test income of recipient and spouse all household incomes all household incomes all household incomes
Earnings disregards 10.6% (11.4% for HH w. child) of
previous net earnings + 53% (57%
for HH w. child) of spouse's net
earnings, minimum: 165e
minimum: 74e, maximum: 148e see Footnote 29 30% of net earnings, maximum:
173e
Maximum wealth 200e per year of life (recipient
and partner), minimum: 4,100e,
maximum: 13,000e
recipient aged >59 years: 1,279e
(2,301e), spouse: 614 e, 256e
per child
200 e per year of life , children:
4,100 e; old-age provision
recipient aged >59 years: 1,600e





























7Household selection In order to estimate our model of take-up behaviour in Section
4 we look at the rst three years after the introduction of the Hartz IV reform, i.e. 2005,
2006 and 2007. Since we use retrospective information, GSOEP waves 2006-2008 are
employed. Missing information on certain household and personal variables prevents
us from using all households in the simulation sample. Table 7 gives an overview of
the initial number of private households in GSOEP waves 2005 to 2007 along with the
selection steps leading to the simulation sample.
Table 7: Household selection for the simulation years 2005-2007
Selection step 2005 2006 2007
N  N  N 
Initial number of private households in
GSOEP
11,440 (-) 12,499 (-) 11,689 (-)
Exclusion of households without
interviewed head of HH and/or partner
11,359 81 12,413 86 11,618 71
Exclusion of couple households with
survey non-response of partner
10,704 655 11,614 799 10,903 715
Households interviewed in the
simulation year and the following year
9,509 1,195 10,217 1,397 9,629 1,274
Exclusion of households with missing
information on worked hours, wages and
other income variables
8,685 869 8,981 1,182 8,408 1,101
Households in simulation sample 8,685 8,981 8,408
Note: N=remaining number of households, =change in numbers of households in the
respective selection step.
Source: Own computations based on GSOEP years 2005-2007.
In the rst two steps we drop households in which either the head of the household
or { in case of couple households { the partner of the head of household could not
be interviewed. The quantitatively most important selection step results from the
fact that we use retrospective information to compute net income, transfer eligibility
and benet take-up. Thus, all households which did not partake in the survey the
year after the respective base year are dropped from the sample. Finally, we exclude
households which stated having received earned income, income from self-employment,
unemployment benets, rental income or nancial support from private persons not
living within the household, but did not provide information on either the monthly
amount and/or the number of months of receipt of the respective type of income.31
When extrapolating model results to the whole population, we account for the dropped
households by adjusting the households weights in such a way that the selected sample
is still representative of all private households in Germany. This is done by grouping
the data using all combinations of certain discrete household variables (e.g. type of
family, sex, region, formal skill, age group, number of children) and then multiplying
the original household weights with the inverse of the group specic rates of exclusion.
31 Where possible, we impute missing retrospective information on incomes by using corresponding
information from the month of interview. For example, if a household states that it received earned
income for twelve months in the previous year but does not provide information on the monthly
amount, we use monthly income from the month of interview.
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module is the computation of household net income under varying tax and transfer rules.
If the labour supply reaction to a policy change is to be analysed, the tax and transfer
module provides the households' budget restrictions which enter the labour supply
model. Table 8 describes the incomes and contributions considered in the computation
of net household income.
Table 8: Components of net household income
Income components Determined in tax
and transfer module?
1 Earned income no
+ Self-employed income no
+ Capital income no
+ Rental income no
+ Other incomes (pensions) no
2 - Social security contributions yes
- Income tax yes
- Alimony payments yes
3 + Child benet yes
+ Child-raising allowance yes
+ Unemployment benets yesa
+ Federal student support, stipends, claims to
maintenance, widow's allowance, maternity allowance,
reduced hours compensation
no
4 + Housing allowance yes
+ Children's allowance yes
+ Social assistance for employable persons (SGB II) yes
+ Social assistance for unemployable persons (SGB XII) yes
= Net household income yes
aEndogenous if labour supply reactions are considered. Otherwise we use reported unemployment benets.
The table is divided in four parts, which give (1) the exogenous (gross) revenues of
the household, (2) endogenous deductions (taxes and social security contributions),
(3) non-means-tested benets, which are only partly endogenous and (4) endogenous
means-tested benets. As described in Section 2.2, means-tested benets are in general
mutually exclusive since the introduction of SA reforms in Germany in 2005, i.e. a
household can be eligible to only one means-tested benet. The only exception is that
housing allowance and children's allowance can be claimed simultaneously.
Determining eligibility to means-tested benets Figure 2 describes the process
of determining eligibility to means-tested benets within the IAB-STSM.
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In order to determine eligibility to SA a person rst has to be classied as either em-
ployable or not employable. For employable (unemployable) persons in the household,
eligibility to SA for employable (unemployable) households is checked in the model.
The legal framework for employable persons is given by the Book II of the Social Code
(SGB II), while unemployable persons fall under the Book XII of the Social Code
(SGB XII).32 The legal denition of employability given in x 8(1) SGB II is rather
vague.33 Thus, employability in the sense of the SGB II cannot be precisely deter-
mined using information from the GSOEP. In the model, we categorise a person as
employable, if he or she is aged between 15 and 64, does not work in a sheltered work-
shop and either has a degree of disability smaller than 80%34 or receives earned income.
If a household is categorised as unemployable and passes the eligibility check for
SGB XII benets, the model compares the claim for SA to a possible claim for housing
32 Note that in practice households can receive both, SGB II and SGB XII benets. Take, for example,
a household of an unemployable (in the sense of x 8 SGB II) single parent and an employable child.
The former can only be eligible to SGB XII benets, while the latter can only claim SGB II benets.
Although this case rarely occurs, Figure 2 gives a simplied picture of determining eligibility, since
it suggests that a household can only claim one type of SA.
33 x 8(1) SGB II loosely states that a person is employable, if illness or disability does not disable her
for the forseeable future to work at least three hours a day under the regular conditions of the labour
market. In practice, employability is determined by public health ocers.
34 A disability degree of 80% is chosen to approximately calibrate the relative number of SGB II to
SGB XII recipients in the model to the ocial numbers on SGB II and SGB XII recipients.
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on the other hand, the household is classied as employable and passes the eligibility
check for SGB II benets, the model also checks eligibility for the so called \children's
allowance"(ACA). Households are eligible to ACA, if the parents income is high enough
to cover their own basic needs (determined by the SGB II), but not the basic needs of
children in the household. In the case of eligibility to ACA, the model compares the
sum of ACA and a possible claim to housing benets to the SGB II benet and again
assumes that the household claims the higher benet.
C Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity of RNTs with respect to the \take-up threshold" In our study
a household is dened as a persistent take-up household, if a) it is eligible according
to the IAB-STSM and b) if it claims SA for more than six months. Table 9 shows
the sensitivity of the persistent RNT to the choice of this threshold. Thus, we vary
the number of months x the household has to claim the benet to be classied as a
persistent take-up household in a particular year, x  xmin, xmin = 1;2;:::;12. Row
x  7 in Table 9 corresponds to the RNT reported in Table 2. Obviously, the RNTs are
quite sensitive to the chosen threshold. The largest range of persistent RNTs occurs for
the year 2007, where it amounts to 18 percentage points. Nonetheless, for all chosen
thresholds we nd a substantial drop in the RNT in 2006.






1 42.43 37.12 34.59
2 42.87 37.19 34.88
3 43.37 37.77 35.96
4 44.34 38.96 37.54
5 45.28 39.82 38.84
6 46.80 40.39 39.57
7 48.85 41.73 41.31
8 49.62 42.07 42.04
9 51.09 43.07 43.21
10 54.33 45.25 44.14
11 56.17 50.81 51.10
12 56.53 51.58 52.59
Note: Non-take-up rates in per cent.
Source: GSOEP, IAB-STSM.
Sensitivity of RNTs with respect to the wealth test Furthermore, many recent
studies stress the importance of whether and how wealth is taken into account when
determining eligibility of a household (Riphahn, 2001; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Frick/Groh-
Samberg, 2007). Table 10 presents simulated RNTs without considering wealth and
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previous results. A comparison with Table 2 reveals that all RNTs are 3:5 to 7 per-
centage points higher if the wealth test is ignored. These increases in the rates are in
line with Frick/Groh-Samberg (2007), who simulate the eects of a wealth check on
non-take-up rates for the pre-reform SA in Germany. This suggests that RNTs are not
very sensitive to wealth considerations and that the impact of the wealth check has not
changed substantially after the SA reform in 2005.
Table 10: Rates of persistent and temporary non-take-up of social assistance excluding
wealth check 2005-2007
Year 2005 2006 2007
Non-take-up rate (persistent) 55.76 46.49 45.97
C. I. [51.30 - 60.21] [42.31 - 50.67] [41.40 - 50.53]
Non-take-up rate (temporary) 61.93 53.28 49.94
C. I. [58.00 - 65.86] [49.17 - 57.40] [45.79 - 54.09]
Note: Non-take-up rates in per cent. C. I.: Bootstrapped 95%-condence intervals.
Source: GSOEP, IAB-STSM.
Sensitivity of RNTs with respect to the sample selection The temporary
RNTs in Table 2 are based on the same sample as the persistent RNTs. Dierences
between the RNTs in a given year are therefore based only on the respective concept
of take-up. Equalising the samples for both concepts necessitates dropping households
which did not participate in the survey the year after the respective simulation year for
both concepts of take-up (see Table 7 in Appendix B), although our temporary concept
of take-up does not require retrospective information. For this reason we simulate the
temporary RNT without excluding households which did not participate in the year
after the respective simulation year. Results are given in Table 11. While using the
larger sample has no eect on the temporary RNT in 2005, the drop in 2006 is markedly
smaller (but still signicant at the 10% level).
Table 11: Rates of temporary non-take-up of social assistance including households
which did not participate in the survey the year after the respective year of simulation
Year 2005 2006 2007
Non-take-up rate (temporary) 58.75 51.91 50.38
C. I. [54.51 - 63.01] [47.76 - 56.07] [46.35 - 54.41]
Note: Non-take-up rates in per cent. C. I.: Bootstrapped 95%-condence intervals.
Source: GSOEP, IAB-STSM.
Table 12 presents estimation results for the model of take-up using the temporary
measure of non-take-up. Comparison with Table 4 shows that the results for both
measures are largely in line. The marginal eects have the same size and signicance
for most of the variables. Notable exceptions are the single household dummy, which is
positively signicant for the temporary take-up measure, but not for persistent take-up.
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still positive, but smaller in size, which is consistent with the relatively smaller drop of
the RNT in 2006 observed for the temporary take-up measure.
D Means of covariates used in the regression
Table 13 present the means of the employed covariates in our sample of households
eligible for SA in the pooled sample for the years 2005 to 2007.35
As expected, the mean calculated monthly benet is considerably higher (666e per
month versus 296e per month) for the group of SA recipients than for the group
of non-recipients. Also consistent with our hypotheses on the take-up eect of the
used covariates, we nd signicantly higher shares for single parents and families with
children, as well as a higher mean of infants in the take-up group. The share of retired
heads of household is nearly three times as large in the non-take-up group, which
suggests that for these households the information and stigma costs of claiming outweigh
the utility from claiming in many cases. Regarding the qualication dummies, the share
Table 12: Marginal eects on temporary take-up decision
Probit IV Probit 2SLS RE
Calculated monthly benet (in 100e) .04983 .06731 .07817 .06992
Single .05328 .06981 .08663 .07550
Single parent .09625 .05530 .08081 .07140
Family with children .01578 -.03589 -.03029 -.03741
Number of young children (age<=3
years)
.11426 .09769 .11061 .09469
Number of older children (age>14 years) -.08778 -.09183 -.10594 -.08948
Head of HH retired -.28906 -.18122 -.19875 -.19498
Disability of head of HH -.15610 -.12316 -.12884 -.12377
High qual. head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
-.10522 -.09222 -.11439 -.12448
Low qual. head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
.04390 .02845 .02571 .04107
Age .00583 .00402 .00473 .00438
Male head of HH .02797 .01515 .02379 .02431
Foreign national head of HH .05719 .04952 .05126 .06051
Rural area (ref.: interm. area) .02638 .02575 .02735 .02802
Metropolitan area (ref.: interm. area) -.00398 -.00468 -.00871 .00487
Eastern Germany .17308 .16489 .18622 .19608
Home owner household -.15085 -.10670 -.12059 -.15003
Dummy 2006 .03703 .02357 .02743 .03325
Dummy 2007 .04819 .03655 .03940 .04024
Observations 2726 2726 2726 2726
Wald test of exogeneity: 2(1) 5.45
(Pseudo)R2 0.234 0.429 0.275
Note: Pooled estimation using GSOEP years 2005 - 2007.
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
35 We show the means for the pooled sample, since the estimation also pools data for the three years
2005 to 2007. Since most of the variables are household characteristics, the mean values do not vary
substantially over the three waves.
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Non-take-up Take-up Full sample
Calculated monthly benet (in 100e) 2.90 6.62 4.95
Singles 0.53 0.39 0.45
Single parents 0.14 0.22 0.19
Family with children 0.12 0.20 0.17
Number of young children (age<=3years) 0.07 0.16 0.12
Number of older children (age>14years, cont.) 0.21 0.28 0.25
Head of HH retired 0.18 0.06 0.11
Disability of head of HH 0.03 0.02 0.02
High qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
0.15 0.08 0.11
Low qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm. qual.) 0.28 0.30 0.29
Age 43.48 43.12 43.28
Male head of HH 0.40 0.44 0.42
Foreign national head of HH 0.12 0.12 0.12
Rural area (ref.: interm. area) 0.15 0.17 0.16
Metropolitan area (ref.: interm. area) 0.49 0.44 0.46
Eastern Germany 0.30 0.42 0.37
Home owner household 0.14 0.08 0.11
Dummy 2006 0.34 0.38 0.36
Dummy 2007 0.35 0.34 0.34
Sample size 1152 1421 2573
Source: GSOEP, authors' own computations based on IAB-STSM. Stars denote rejection of the t-test
on equal means in the take-up and non-take-up groups on the signicance levels
 p < 0:1,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
of highly qualied heads of household is { as expected { signicantly lower in the take-
up group, while there is no statistical dierence in the shares of the low-qualied heads
of household. For the regional dummies, we nd a lower share of metropolitan area
residents in take-up households and a slightly (although not signicantly) higher share
in rural areas. This may simply reect that the eect of worse labour market conditions
in rural areas compared to metropolitan areas overcompensates for the assumed lower
stigma costs in metropolitan areas. Worse labour market conditions should also explain
the signicantly higher share of take-up households in eastern Germany. Consistent
with our hypotheses, the share of home owners in the non-take-up group is twice as
large as in the take-up group. Finally, Table 14 presents the means of the covariates for
households eligible to SA (SGB II and SGB XII) for each year. Obviously, the means
do not vary substantially across the years. This suggests that the composition of the
eligible population did not change signicantly over time.
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2005 2006 2007
Calculated monthly benet (in 100e) 4.99 5.08 4.78
Singles 0.42 0.45 0.46
Single parents 0.19 0.19 0.17
Family with children 0.18 0.15 0.16
Number of young children (age<=3years) 0.11 0.12 0.12
Number of older children (age>14years, cont.) 0.29 0.23 0.21
Head of HH retired 0.11 0.10 0.11
Disability of head of HH 0.01 0.02 0.02
High qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm.
qual.)
0.10 0.11 0.11
Low qualif. of head of HH (ref.: interm. qual.) 0.29 0.29 0.28
Age 43.47 43.14 43.25
Male head of HH 0.42 0.44 0.39
Foreign national head of HH 0.13 0.11 0.10
Rural area (ref.: interm. area) 0.14 0.17 0.16
Metropolitan area (ref.: interm. area) 0.46 0.42 0.49
Eastern Germany 0.36 0.36 0.37
Home owner household 0.11 0.10 0.09
Sample size 763 923 887
Source: GSOEP, authors' own computations based on IAB-STSM.
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